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Value-relevance of the Aging Disclosure of Accounts Receivable: 
Evidence from Chinese A-share Listed Firms 
Abstract 
This study is the first to investigate the following two main research questions 
in China's A-share capital market: 1) The value-relevance of Accounts Receivable 
(AR) aging disclosure information to the market value of equity; 2) The investors' 
awareness of the new accounting method about provision for bad debt upon the 
issuance of "Accounting Regulations for Shareholding Limited Corporation" 
(ARSLC) in January 1998. Regressions are performed on the valuation models with a 
sample of 2,225 firm-years, during the period 1995-1998. 
I obtain three major findings. First, AR contains incremental information 
content in the market equity price in addition to information content in earnings and 
other components of book equity value, especially AR less than 1 year old. Second, 
investors value the four AR aging components significantly different from one 
another. The valuation coefficient for AR less than 1 year old is higher than for the 
other three aging variables. Third, firms with more credit sales and outstanding AR 
are more likely to adopt the new accounting method. Especially, the "big-bath" 
phenomenon happened for loss firms. Profit firms may adopt the new accounting 
method to smooth out their net income. Investors consider the quality of net AR for 
adopting firms to be worse than for non-adopting firms. In particular, investors put a 
significantly higher coefficient on net AR for loss firms and a significantly lower 
coefficient on net AR for profit firms, compared with that for non-adopting firms. 
To sum up, this study provides empirical evidence that information on AR 
aging disclosure is value-relevant and reliable to investors and the new accounting 
standard is effective. Practical implications are that policy makers should control the 
behavior of disclosing incomplete financial information and investors need to pay 
attention to China's specific economic and accounting regulatory climate. 
Key Words: Value-Relevance, Information content, Provision for Bad Debt (Bad 
Debt Allowance), Aging Components 
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Value-relevance of the Aging Disclosure of Accounts Receivable: 
Evidence from Chinese A-share Listed Firms 
1. Introduction 
The problem of bad debt, or ‘‘debt triangulation，’，is a pervasive phenomenon in China. 
A huge number of Accounts Receivable (AR) held by Chinese firms arc defaulted. The 
following newspaper report illustrates how serious the problem is: 
"In 1997, among the 755 listed f irms in the Shenzhen Slock Exchange and ihc Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 126 firms increased AR by over 100% and 7 firms by over 1000%. 50 f irms have the ratio of AR 
over main operation revenue higher than 80% and 26 firms even higher than 100%." (Shenzhen Security 
Times, May 20, 1998) 
On the other hand, the figures shown for Bad Debt Allowance under the Chinese 
GAAP did not reflect the actual default risk before 1998. According to “Accounting 
Regulations for Experimental Shareholding Corporations - Accounting Items and Accounting 
Statements,，(The Ministry of Finance, 1992)，Chinese listed firms were required to make 
provision for bad debt within a fixed range of 0.3-0.5% of the AR ending balance. Given that 
many receivables are in arrears, the recorded bad debt expense is greatly understated, which 
means that it cannot provide useful information to investors on the true financial status of a 
firm. 
In order to compensate for the disadvantage mentioned above, in December 1995 the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued "Guideline on the Information 
Disclosures for Public Listed Companies (No.2)". This guideline requires listed firms to 
disclose the age of the AR in the footnote ‘‘Accounts Receivable". In that footnote, total AR 
must be broken down into four age periods: less than 1 year; from 1 to 2 years; from 2 to 3 
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years; and more than 3 years. This paper will examine whether disclosure of information on 
AR aging is helpful to investors for estimating the bad debt expense. 
Several prior empirical studies have examined the information content of financial 
statement accounting variables in China's A-, B- and H-share markets (Haw, Qi and Wu 
1998, 1999; Bao and Chow 1999; Abdel-Khalik, Wong and Wu 1999). These studies 
conclude that accounting earnings contain useful information in the A-share stock market 
(Haw et al. 1999; Abdel-Khalik et al. 1999) and that book equity value is value-relevant in the 
B-share stock market (Haw et al. 1998; Bao et al. 1999). However, there has been no attempt 
to explore the value-relevance of accounting disclosure information, especially AR aging 
disclosure. This study is the first to investigate the association between market equity value 
and information on AR aging disclosure, in China's A-share stock market. 
In January 1998, the Ministry of Finance published "Accounting Regulations for 
Shareholding Limited Corporation - Accounting Items and Accounting Statements" 
(ARSLC). This new regulation allowed some A-share listed firms to select the rate of 
provision for bad debt for themselves, thus permitting such firms to record provision for bad 
debt beyond the range of 0.3% - 0.5% of the AR ending balance. This enables investors to 
determine the amount of bad debt expense directly from the Bad Debt Allowance for firms 
that adopt the new method to record their provision for bad debt (I classify these firms as 
“adopting firms" and other firms as "non-adopting firms"). Further research interest will focus 
on which firms are more likely to adopt this new method and how investors will view those 
firms when assessing their market price. Previous accounting choice literature (Jennings, Mest 
and Thompson 1992，Barth，Beaver and Landsman 1992, and Amir and Livnat 1996) provides 
a background for the relevant research methodologies. 
This study empirically tests the following research questions: 1) whether information 
on aging disclosures is incrementally informative to the market price in addition to earnings 
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and other components of book equity value; 2) whether investors implicitly assign 
significantly different multiples to AR aging components when assessing market equity value; 
3) whether investors react to the issuance of ARSLC by assigning totally different coefficients 
to net AR based on whether a firm is an adopting firm or a non-adopting firm. 
Relying on the research methodologies used in the previous literature on financial 
disclosure and valuation, I investigate the value-relevance of AR aging disclosure and the 
impact of the issuance of ARSLC. The final sample consists of 2,225 A-share firm years 
during the period 1995 - 1998. A price model formulates the market value of equity as a linear 
function of earnings, the book value of equity excluding AR, and the AR / AR aging 
variables. To examine the influence of the accounting change in 1998, a dummy variable is 
added into the price model to separate adopting firms and non-adopting firms. Then two 
dummy variables are used instead of one to further partition adopting firms into loss firms (net 
income < 0) and profit firms (net income >0). A return model is also included to investigate 
this accounting change. 
This paper presents three major findings. First, AR contains incremental information 
content in the market equity price in addition to information content in earnings and other 
components of book equity value, especially AR less than 1 year old. Second, investors value 
the four AR aging components significantly different from one another. The valuation 
coefficient for AR less than 1 year old is higher than for the other three aging variables. 
Third, firms with more credit sales and outstanding AR are more likely to adopt the new 
accounting method. Especially, the "big-bath" phenomenon happened for loss firms. Profit 
firms may adopt the new accounting method to smooth out their net income. Investors 
consider the quality of net AR for adopting firms to be worse than for non-adopting firms. In 
particular, investors put a significantly higher coefficient on net AR for loss firms and a 
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significantly lower coefficient on net AR for profit firms, compared with that for non-
adopting firms. 
The case of Guangzhou Baiyunshan Co. Ltd. illustrates the "big-bath" phenomenon. 
In 1998，this company recorded its provision for bad debt as 203.3 million RMB, which 
represents 48.6% of its AR ending balance. This amount reduced its 1998 earnings to -898.5 
million RMB. However, its 1999 earnings were enhanced to 56.3 million RMB due to a much 
smaller amount of provision for bad debt, even though its bad debt allowance extraction 
method did not change. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the development of 
the Chinese accounting standards system, describes the relevant accounting regulations for 
AR, and discusses the bad debt problem. Section 3 places this study in the context of the past 
research. Section 4 describes the sample selection criteria. Section 5 develops the hypotheses 
and the issues of variable specification. Section 6 presents related empirical findings. 
Concluding remarks are contained in section 7. 
2. The Institutional Background 
2.1 Accounting Standards for Listed Firms 
In China, the disclosure requirements for listed firms are regulated by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The MOF 
establishes general accounting standards and specific accounting regulations. As the 
equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S., the CSRC prescribes the 
disclosure requirements in the Chinese securities market. Table 1 shows the framework of the 
main accounting regulations for listed firms in China. 
In January 1992，the MOF issued "Accounting Regulations for Experimental 
Shareholding Corporations - Accounting Items and Accounting Statements" which 
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constituted the first systematic accounting standard to regulate corporate companies and 
provided the original principle of recording provision for bad debt (Lin et al. 1998; Xiang 
1998). In July 1993, the effectiveness of "Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises" 
(ASBE) by the MOF brought Chinese accounting practice closely into line with the IAS 
(Tang, Chow and Cooper 1996). Based on ASBE, various rules concerning disclosures of 
public listed companies were later enacted. In particular, the "Guideline on the Information 
Disclosures for Public Listed Companies (No.2)" issued by the CSRC in December 1995 
specifies the regulation of AR aging disclosures. Since 1998, a series of new accounting 
regulations have been issued to replace the previous temporary accounting standards. Among 
them, "Accounting Regulations for Shareholding Limited Corporation - Accounting Items 
and Accounting Statements", which is released in January 1998, changes the previous method 
of recording provision for bad debt. 
2.2 Relevant Disclosures for Bad Debt 
According to the ASBE, two accounting approaches are used to record doubtful AR. 
One is called the Direct Write-off Method，which places the bad debt loss directly into the 
accounts of cost or expense when AR is uncollectable. The other is called the Bad Debt 
Allowance Method, which uses the Bad Debt Allowance account to show the provision for 
bad debt and deducts from this account the bad debt provision when bad debt occurs. There 
are several ways to calculate bad debt provisions. However, prior to 1998, only the Accounts 
Receivable Balance Percent Method was used. This requires the amount of bad debt 
provision to be proportional to the ending balance of AR for the current year. As stated in the 
"Accounting Regulations for Experimental Shareholding Corporations - Accounting Items 
and Accounting Statements", listed firms are restricted to a fixed range of 0.3 - 0.5% of the 
AR ending balance. 
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Because the fixed rate of bad debt provision could not reveal the real amount of 
defaulted AR, investors may rely on the mandatory aging disclosures to find out a proxy for 
bad debt expense. Each company must separate its total amount of AR (including provision 
for bad debt) into four ages: less than 1 year, from 1 to 2 years，from 2 to 3 years, more than 
3 years. The age is calculated as the time lag between the current year and the year when the 
AR was booked. The AR amounts are disclosed either by percentage value or absolute value. 
Some firms even listed comparative AR amounts for the current and previous years. 
In order to keep up with the IAS and the US-GAAP, on January 27, 1998，the MOF 
enacted the ARSLC. This prescribes that under the item of "Accounts Receivable", listed 
firms issuing stocks in the B-share or the H-share stock market, and listed firms with foreign 
funds in the A-share stock market, are mandated to determine themselves the rate of bad debt 
provision and extraction method. Other listed firms (A-share) can voluntarily choose whether 
to accept this new accounting regulation. This means that for all the B-share and H-share 
companies, along with some A-share companies with foreign funds, the rate of AR bad debt 
provision and the recording method are no longer fixed, but are decided by the companies, in 
the light of their particular situation. 
Appendix 1 demonstrates an example selected from the 1998 annual report abstract of 
the Shenzhen Zhonghao (Group). The ratio of AR over total assets (10.88%) and the ratio of 
AR over shareholder's equity (31.04%) are so high that the low probability of collecting AR 
could have an enormous impact on the company's profits and shareholder's benefits. The AR 
aging disclosure shows that AR more than 3 years old constitutes 84.44% of the AR ending 
balance, a figure representing an extremely high risk of default. Thus the analysis of AR 
aging disclosure is of obviously substantial importance to investors, and in fact, Zhonghao 
had to sell one of its subsidiary supermarkets in order to pay its debt. 
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2.3 The Bad Debt Problem 
The IAS and the US-GAAP neither stipulate a fixed rate method to calculate 
provision for bad debt nor require firms to disclose AR aging information (Coopers & 
Lybrand 1993). The PRC-GAAP concerning AR is a unique accounting regulation which is 
quite different from the IAS and US-GAAP regulations prior to the effectiveness of the 
ARSLC. The problem of so called “debt triangulation", reflecting an enormous number of 
AR in arrears, is very common among Chinese firms. 
For a long time, Chinese buyers generally regarded credit sales as an option that 
would allow them to postpone payments for goods and services, or even avoid payments at a 
later stage. By manipulating their AR account, many firms succeeded in raising their reported 
earnings for various reasons - for example, to meet the requirement of 10% ROE over 3 years 
for the issuance of stock rights (Haw, Qi，Wu and Zhang 1998). Recent competition in the 
market and the effects of the Asian financial crisis have pushed Chinese companies to 
increase credit sales, in order to broaden their market occupation and improve their export 
performance. Related party transactions and inefficient government investment projects have 
also led to delayed payment of AR. All these factors have contributed to the growth of AR 
(Shenzhen Security Times, Dec. 31, 1998). 
Increased levels of AR have often been the consequence of increased bad debt. The 
existence of a very high level of bad debt raises the default risk of a firm, thus reduces its cash 
flow and falsifies the market's perception of its real firm value. While the IAS and the US-
GAAP usually view AR more than 1 year old as being uncollectable, Chinese accountants are 
forbidden to write off AR more than 1 year old or to reclassify a receivable as a long-term 
asset (Graham et al. 1998). 
Due to the specific environment of business and accounting in China, information on 
bad debt is critical for decisions of investors. However, prior to 1998, using the Bad Debt 
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Allowance account, investors could not get accurate numbers of bad debt expenses and would 
be more likely to rely on other information sources. The required AR aging disclosures might 
meet the needs of investors and consequently, an analysis of the value-relevance of the AR 
aging disclosure may prove quite helpful. 
3. Literature Review and Prior Research Design 
3.1 Financial Disclosure Research 
A review of previous literature addressing financial disclosure research is necessary 
to explore the research questions in this study. Referring to the purposes of discloses required 
by the FASB (Barth and Murphy 1994), the whole body of financial disclosure literature can 
be divided into three main groups: recognized items, unrecognized items and information 
beyond financial statements (Barth 1998). The main body of financial disclosure research 
concentrates on the first two groups. The principal subjects of recognized items are pension 
assets and liabilities, fair value accounting, non-performing bank loans, and post-retirement 
benefits other than pensions. The research on unrecognized items deals primarily with 
pension expenses. 
FASB requires firms to show in their balance sheet their pension assets and 
liabilities and to disclose in footnotes one pension asset (fair value of pension assets) and 
three pension liabilities (projected benefit obligation, accumulated benefit obligation, and 
vested benefit obligation). Research interest has focused on whether the pension disclosure 
has information content. Landsman (1986) and Barth (1991) indicate that pension assets and 
liabilities in footnotes are perceived by the market as corporate assets and liabilities and are 
close to investors' assessment. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1993) otherwise suggest that 
pension-related balance sheet information in addition to pension-related earnings information 
may be helpful in understanding the share price structure. Amir and Benartzi (1998) further 
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demonstrate that the expected rate of return on pension assets is useful for forecasting net 
income but the proportion of pension assets invested in equity securities is not. 
U.S. financial instruments are required to show investment securities at cost, subject 
to any adjustment for unamortized premium or discount. Gains and losses are recognized 
only when realized. SFAS 107 further asks firms to estimate in a footnote assets and 
liabilities for five financial instruments (total securities, loans, deposits, long-term debt and 
off-balance sheet instruments). A significant amount of research has been done on the value-
relevance of fair value accounting. While Barth et al. (1990) suggest that fair value securities 
gains and losses are value-relevant, Barth (1994) argues that investment securities' fair values 
have explanatory power beyond historical costs. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1996) find 
that differences between disclosed fair values and book values of securities, loans and long-
term debt are value-relevant, but those for deposits and off-balance-sheet items are not. 
Contrary to the practice under the U.S. GAAP, long-lived assets under the Australian 
GAAP and fixed assets under the U.K. GAAP can be revalued at fair value. Barth and Clinch 
(1998) and Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (1999) investigate asset evaluation for the two 
countries separately. The former documents that revalued financial, tangible and intangible 
assets are value-relevant. The latter indicates that asset revaluations reflect changes in 
management expectations about the future performance of the firm. 
The non-performing loans of US commercial banks (non-accrual, past due loans and 
restructured troubled debt), along with the accounting for loan loss provision and loan 
charge-offs in financial statements, are another subject of the current debate on disclosure 
research. Researchers concentrate on exploring whether there is any association between 
market price and non-performing loans. Beaver, Eger, Ryan and Wolfson (1989) believe that 
non-performing loans regarding default risk explain incremental but negative variations in 
market-to-book ratio. Similar results can be applied to the scheduled items of thrifts (Barth, 
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Beaver and Christopher 1991). Beaver et al. (1989)，Griffin and Wallach (1991) and Wahlen 
(1994) conclude that conditional on non-performing assets, the market associates positively 
with loan loss provision. Then Beaver and Engel (1996) indicate that under these conditions, 
the market further breaks down the allowance made for loan losses into a non-discretionary 
component that is negatively priced and a discretionary component that is positively priced. 
Other studies probe the value-relevance of post-retirement benefits other than 
pensions (PRE) - a disclosure required by SFAS 106 to report the accrual of expected costs 
of post-retirement benefit, such as health care and life insurance. Amir (1993) finds that the 
PRB obligation is useful for assessing equity market values in addition to cash payment. 
Amir (1996) points out that information on PRB liabilities and net PRB cost is useful to 
equity investors in addition to pension information. However, Choi, Collins and Johnson 
(1997) believe that controlling for pension information, PRB liabilities are only marginally 
significant in explaining cross-sectional variation in share prices. 
In the second group of financial disclosure literature (unrecognized items) pension 
expenses components are the main focus. Four components of pension cost are reported in 
footnotes: service cost, interest cost, actual return on plan assets, and net deferral and 
amortization, which can be further discomposed into deferred return on plan assets and 
amortization of transitional assets. Similar to the relationship between AR and book value 
equity excluding AR, and the relationship among AR aging variables, the issue of the 
difference between pension expense and non-pension earnings components and the difference 
across pension expense components is addressed by Barth et al. (1992, 1993). They attribute 
higher multiples on pension cost than on non-pension income components to higher fixed-
income security. Furthermore, they indicate that investors assign significantly different 
multiples to pension cost components, except that the coefficient on amortization of the 
transition asset is not significantly different from zero. 
11 
A specific concern in disclosure research is the accounting choice selection. The U.S. 
GAAP allows listed firms to select whether and when to accept UFO / FIFO, pension and 
PRE accounting standards, etc. For example, firms have a 2-year period to decide whether to 
adopt a pension standard and a 3-year period to decide whether to accept PRB. Therefore 
researchers are in a position to investigate the stock price response to the adoption of those 
accounting standards. Their research methodologies can be usefully employed in this study. 
Several studies address the choice of LIFO / FIFO, pension and PRB accounting 
standards. Jennings et al. (1992) use the return model to examine the stock price change in 
reaction to the LIFO decision disclosure for each sample of adopting and non-adopting firms 
for the single year of 1974. They find evidence of a price response for both adopting and non-
adopting firms. Barth et al. (1992) apply an indicator variable to classify those firms adopting 
the pension standard (SFAS 87) before it was mandatory and those firms who were later 
required to disclose pension components. Their finding is that the coefficients on pension 
components for early adopting firms are insignificant. Amir et al. (1996) examine the motives 
for US managers to choose a time for adopting the PRB standard. Using a valuation equation 
to estimate unexpected PRB liability, they suggest that one reason for firms to adopt the PRB 
in different years is to increase the market's awareness of PRB liability. � 
3.2 Valuation Model 
Valuation research, using accounting information to estimate the value of a firm, is 
often the reason for studying corporate disclosures. The selection of a valuation model 
depends on the question being studied, the model's underlying assumptions and econometric 
grounds (Christie 1987; Barth 1998). There are two different kinds of valuation models used 
in previous research. One is the balance sheet model (the price model) which is based on the 
association between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. This model can 
also be expressed as the combination of both earnings and book equity value to explain 
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market equity value (Barth 1998). The other is the capitalized earnings model (the return 
model) that links the rate of return with net income. 
The price model originates from a standard one by Landsman (1986): 
MVE-=a,MVA+a^MVL 
where MVE is the market value of equity, MVA is the market value of assets, and 
MVL is the market value of liability. It means that the market value of a firm is a weighted 
combination of its asset and liability market value. The accounting value of its asset and 
liability may be regarded as proxies for its market value. Different components of its asset 
and liability are disaggregated depending on the research objectives. Beaver et al. (1989), 
Wahlen (1994) and Barth et al. (1991) adopted the market value concept to study non-
performing loans and the supplemental disclosure valuation problems of thrifts. Other studies 
employ an accounting value concept, such as pensions, fair value and PRB (Landsman 1986; 
Barth 1991; Barth 1994; Choi et al. 1997). In fair value studies, Barth (1991), Barth et al. 
(1991) and Barth et al. (1996) used a variation of this model. The dependent variable they use 
is the difference between the market and the book value of equity and their independent 
variables are the differences between the fair and the book values of SFAS No. 107 
components. 
Subsequently, Barth et al. (1992, 1993) developed the price model in a different form: 
where NI is net income. This model derives from the notion that in a perfect and 
complete market, net income is defined as a firm's permanent earnings and p , the reciprocal 
of the discount rate, is the cost of capital. Barth et al. (1993) break down net income into non-
pension revenue, non-pension expense and five pension cost components. 
However, when the market is not perfect and complete, the market equity value is the 
sum of recognized net assets and unrecognized net assets, the proxy of the latter is net income 
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since net income represents the change on net assets (Barth and Landsman 1995; Ohlson 
1995). Thus market equity value becomes a function of both book equity value and earnings 
(Easton, Eddey and Harris 1993): 
MVE 二 0)斯E + CO 卯 
In Australian asset revaluation research, Barth and Clinch (1998) break down the 
book equity value into investments, PPE, intangible assets and book equity value after 
subtracting the former items. Amir (1993, 1996) uses this model in PRB research to put 
pension and PRB components — accrued PRB liability and unfunded pension liabilities - as 
additional independent variables. 
The return model can be considered as the first difference of the price model. Easton 
and Harris (1991) present the standard return model that uses as the explanatory variables 
both the level of earnings and the change on earnings deflated by the beginning market price. 
They believe that the effect of measurement errors will be mitigated when both the earnings 
level and the earnings change variables are included. Christie (1987) recommends the 
deflation of market equity value at the beginning of the period. The model is expressed as 
follows: 
where Rt is residual stock return at year t, i.e. market adjusted return, E^  is earnings at 
year t，A ,^ is change on earnings at year t-1, and is market equity value at the beginning 
of year t.. To study fair value of banks, Barth (1994) adopted this model to separate earnings 
into securities gains / losses on GAAP and on fair value, and from earnings before securities 
gains / losses. Amir et al. (1993) define an additional independent variable as other 
information in the above model and they assign into the variable of other information the level 
of aggregate earnings reconciliation between U.S. GAAP and non-U.S. GAAP, and the 
change on reconciliation. Barth and Clinch (1998) add an additional variable of the amount of 
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upward / downward asset revaluation while Aboody et al. (1999) include current year 
revaluation as the additional variable. 
The choice of the deflator to control the heteroscedasticity problem is an important 
concern when appropriate valuation models are performed (Christie 1987; Barth and Kallapur 
1996). Some studies accept book value of equity as the deflator (Amir 1993; Amir 1996; 
Beaver and Engel 1996); some adopt market value of equity (Barth et al. 1992; Beaver et al. 
1989; Wahlen 1994; Aboody et al. 1999); some employ the number of outstanding shares 
(Barth et al. 1991; Barth 1994; Barth and Clinch 1998); others do not use any deflators (Barth 
1991; Barth et al. 1996; Barth, Beaver and Landsman 1998; Choi et al. 1997). 
3.4 Relevant Chinese Studies 
It is argued that accounting reporting and market regulatory systems in China are 
relatively primitive and incomplete compared to those in mature markets (Xiang 1998; Haw, 
Qi and Wu 1999). Graham and Li (1999), in particular, believe that historical, cultural and 
economic circumstances make some areas of Chinese accounting practice inexplicable, such 
as the frequent write-off of accounts receivable. They point out: "While the business 
conditions seem to support the need for a provision for bad debts, the attitude and optimism 
inherent in the state policies seem to mitigate against the write-off of an account that is 
expected to be paid". 
Before examining the information content of financial disclosures in the context of 
China's capital market, what first needs to be investigated is whether Chinese investors use 
the information reported in financial statements. Several empirical studies discuss the 
information content of earnings and book values. Haw, Qi and Wu (1999) find the value-
relevance for accounting earnings of A-share listed firms using both the association and the 
event study approach. From an event window, Abdel-Khalik, Wong and Wu (1999) suggest 
that accounting earnings only correlate with A-share prices but not with B-share prices. 
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While Haw, Qi and Wu (1998) observe a significant association between stock return / 
market-to-book value and earnings measured under PRC-GAAP, Bao and Chow (1999) show 
earnings and book value reported under IAS have greater information content than those 
based on PRC-GAAP. 
4. Sample Selection 
The initial sample population is all the A-share listed firms on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) or the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) during the sample period 1995-
1998. Data of AR and AR percentage number under different age periods is hand collected 
from the annual reports of listed firms published by "Shenzhen Security Times" and 
"Shanghai Securities Daily". Firms adopting ARSLC are also identified by reviewing the 
1998 annual reports published in the above newspapers. Financial data from balance sheets 
and income statements and data of equity prices are obtained from the Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ) DataBase. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the number of the final sample following the sample 
selection criteria. I exclude 1,317 (364 + 952 + 1) observations which lack financial data 
(allowance + earnings + book equity value and total assets) from TEJ, eliminate 9 
observations which lack equity price data from TEJ and further delete 232 observations 
which lack AR age amounts from the two newspapers. The final sample is 2,225 firm years 
for price model regressions. The numbers of sample firms in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 are 
248, 443, 719 and 815 respectively. For the full sample, SHSE consists of 1,226 firm years 
while SZSE consists of 999 firm years. Therefore SHSE has a relatively larger size. 
Table 3 reports the sample distribution of AR age values scaled by total assets in 
order to compare different AR age value under the full sample and the yearly sample. Four 
age periods are used: less than 1 year, from 1 to 2 years, from 2 to 3 years, and more than 3 
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years. In Table 3, for the total sample, medians (means) of ARl, AR2, AR3 and AR4 are 
0.072 (0.091)，0.007 (0.016), 0.002 (0.007) and 0.001 (0.005), skewing to the right. This 
indicates that the total amount of AR represents about 10% of total assets and the ratio of the 
AR age component over total assets shows a decreasing trend when AR becomes old. Similar 
results are observed in the sub-sample by year, suggesting there is no significant shift from 
year to year. Moreover, while means of AR2, AR3 and AR4 remain almost unchanged, the 
mean of ARl increases from 0.076 in 1995 to 0.095 in 1998, denoting that either listed firms 
raised their credit sales or that their outstanding AR increased in recent years. Particularly, 
because of the high skewness of AR2, AR3 and AR4, means of AR2, AR3 and AR4 are 
much higher than the median and near to the 75 percentile for the total sample and the yearly 
sample. 
5. Hypotheses and Research Design 
There are three major research questions: 1) whether AR or AR aging components 
are value-relevant to market price; 2) whether coefficients on AR aging components are 
significantly different from one another; 3) whether investors are sophisticated enough to 
respond to the 1998 change in the bad debt allowance method. Section 5.1 explores the first 
two questions and section 5.2 examines the third question. 
5.1 The value-relevance of AR and AR Aging Disclosure Information 
Since AR (including its aging components) is one important short-term asset that 
comprises one part of a firm's book value, it should influence market price significantly. Thus 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
Hypothesis 1: Accounts Receivable (including its aging components) has 
incremental information content in market value of equity. 
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Furthermore, investors may partition AR into different age components and assign 
different coefficients to the AR aging variables. The reason is that the older AR becomes, the 
smaller the influence it may have on the market value of equity. This leads to Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Each aging component of Accounts Receivable has significantly 
different value-relevance to market value of equity. 
To explore those research objectives, I use the price model as the valuation model. 
Easton and Harris (1991), Easton, Eddey and Harris (1993) specify the general form of the 
model. In this model, variables are defined in China's capital market: 
= + + (1) 
where, 
MV)/2 = square root of market value of equity at the end of the fourth month 
following the end of year t for firm j 
BV；, = book value of equity for firm j at year t 
Ejt = net income for firm j at year t 
sjt 二 unexplained portion of market value of equity, i.e. random error term 
All variables are deflated by total assets for firm j at year t. Compared with the 
number of shares, total assets are less correlated with independent variables so that 
coefficients on independent variables are less biased. Since the number of shares causes 
severe White standard errors (Barth and Kallapur 1996), I use total assets as the deflator. 
Market equity value at the end of April of year t+1 is selected because Chinese firms are 
required to announce their annual reports no later than the end of April in the second year. 
The reason for using the square root of market equity value is that the distribution of the 
square root of market equity value is closer to normal distribution. Thus the OLS regression 
assumptions are met. 
According to the explanations of Easton and Harris (1991), market value of a firm is 
a weighted function of book value of equity (net accounting assets) and net income 
(earnings), in which net accounting assets are the "stock" variable and earnings are the 
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"flow" variable. In a perfect and complete market, earnings from income statement are 
redundant as a means of predicting the market perception of the value of a firm. However, in 
a more realistic setting suitable for China's capital market, neither book equity value nor net 
income can transmit all value-relevant information. Thus net income realization can be 
potentially value-relevant together with information extracted from the balance sheet (Barth 
and Landsman 1995). 
Book value of equity is composed of different items that have different systematic 
risks held to maturity. Hence, multiples assigned to them are expected to vary cross-
sectionally as a function of book value components. Following the methodologies of Barth et 
al. (1992) and Barth (1994), I further partition book value of equity as below: 
Book Value of Equity (BV) = Total assets (TA) — Total Liability (TL) 
And, 
Total assets (TA) = Other Asset (OA) + Net Accounting Receivable (NAR) 
=Other Asset (OA) + Accounts Receivable (AR) -Bad Debt Allowance (AAR) 
Thus, 
BV= OA +AR-AAR-TL = (OA -AAR- TL) + AR = OBV + AR 
Let OBV= OA -AAR — TL, i.e. book equity value other than AR. 
As a consequence, book equity value is divided into two parts: one is OBV，the other 
is AR. The model is altered: 
MV]；' =P jP \E j t+ l3 f iBV� t+ lhARj t+S j t (2) 
MV]；' A五力 + /hOBVjt + 4 p^ A^R]：,' + � ( 3 ) 
k=l 
where in equation (2)， 
OBVjt = book value of equity excluding AR for firm j at year t, equal to assets other 
than AR minus the sum of total liability and bad debt allowance 
ARj^  = AR for firm j at year t 
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In equation (3)， 
二 square root of AR under the age period of k for firm j at year t，k=l 
denotes an age of up to 1 year; k=2 denotes an age from 1 to 2 years; k二3 
denotes an age from 2 years to 3 years; k=4 denotes an age of more than 3 
years. 
All variables are deflated by total assets for firm j at year t. In model (3), the aging 
variables are partitioned in line with the classifications in Table 3. Furthermore, in order to 
follow the OLS regression assumptions, the square roots of ARi, AR2，AR3 and AR4are used 
instead as explanatory variables. 
In model (2), since net income represents future cash flows, is expected to be 
significantly positive, p^ should be significantly positive because OBV constructs one part 
of net assets that is positively associated with market price. In terms of Hypothesis 1, the sign 
of is predicted to be significantly positive since AR is one major component of book 
equity value that positively correlates with market value of equity. F-tests are performed to 
check whether coefficients on OBV and AR are the same. 
In model (3), the F-tests examine whether coefficients on AR aging variables are 
different from one another, i.e. Hypothesis 2. The prediction is that ARi, AR2，AR3 and AR4 
are totally different in nature, i.e. P^ ^ 本 ^ . Since the greater the age of AR the 
smaller is the probability of collecting receivables, investors may believe that AR of a greater 
age has less influence on the stock price. Thus the forecast of the aging variable direction is: 
> > >^33 > >^ 34. Py^  and 口从 may not be higher than zero since AR3 and AR4 are 
virtually equivalent to bad debts. 
5.2 The Impact of the Accounting Standard Change in January 1998 
After the issuance of ARSLC in January 1998，some A-share firms adopted the new 
accounting method of determining provision for bad debt themselves. This gave rise to 
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several problems which have aroused intense interest: What kind of firm was willing to 
accept this new method? Why did they do so? Are investors sophisticated enough to be aware 
of this new accounting standard change and able to distinguish between adopting firms and 
non-adopting firms? Is aging disclosure information as value-relevant for adopting firms as 
for non-adopting firms? 
Investors may be sophisticated enough to take this accounting change into 
consideration, so the hypothesis here is: 
Hypothesis 3: Investors differentiate between adopting firms and non-adopting 
firms to assess market value of equity 
In this section，the following two research methods are used. First, each price model is 
regressed within sub-samples of adopting and non-adopting firms. Because the new 
accounting standard makes the ratio of net AR over AR different for adopting firms as 
compared with non-adopting firms, the quality of net AR for adopting firms may be different 
from that for non-adopting firms. Thus I replace the independent variable of AR with net AR 
in the price model. The sub-sample model is revised as follows: 
MV]；' 二 A) + A五力 + 隅BVjt + M 皿 J t + �( 4 a ) 
where, 
NOBVj, = book equity value excluding net AR for firm j at year t, deflated by total 
assets for firm j at year t 
NARj, = net AR for firm j at year t，deflated by total assets for firm j at year t 
Moreover, the return model is added to evaluate the accumulated changes in the 
financial status of firms in 1998.1 use a standard model which originated from Easton and 
Harris (1991) and was refined by Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993). The model is as follows: 
Rj, =Po+ PiEj, + p2^jt + PzNARJ^ + Sjt (5a) 
where, 
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Rjt = market-adjusted annual rate of return for firm j between beginning of May of 
year t and end of April of year t+1 
Ejt 二 net income for firm j at year t, deflated by market value of equity for firm j at 
the beginning of May of year t 
My, = change on net income for firm j at year t, deflated by market value of equity 
of firm j at the beginning of May of year t 
NARjt 二 net AR for firm j at year t, deflated by market value of equity for firm j at 
the beginning of May of year t 
The use of market price at the beginning of the stock return period as the deflator is 
recommended by Christie (1987) and Easton and Harris (1991). The market adjusted rate of 
return is calculated as the difference of the adjusted stock price between fiscal years t and t-1, 
deflated by the adjusted stock price at fiscal year t-1. 
Secondly, following the work of Barth et al. (1992), I employ a dummy variable to 
distinguish adopting firms from non-adopting firms: 
MV]；^  二 y^ o + Px^jt + Pi^OBV., + p.NARj, + P.^DA x NAR� ,+ 巧,(4b) 
The corresponding return model is: 
Rjt =Po + PiEjt + + Py^ARp + PsaDA X NARjt + (5b) 
where DA is the indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm was an adopting firm. 
Otherwise DA would equal 0. All these models will be regressed at the single year of 1998. 
p i ! p3 measures the value-relevance of NAR for the full sample. Psa / p3A measures the 
change of the incremental information content in NAR for adopting firms over that for non-
adopting firms, i.e. the distance of the slope of NAR on MV between adopting firms and non-
adopting firms. Thus Psa/Psa <> 0 tests whether the coefficient on NAR for adopting firms 
is smaller / larger than the coefficient on NAR for non-adopting firms. 
Furthermore, I divide adopting firms into those reporting negative earnings in 1998， 
i.e. loss firms, and those reporting positive earnings in 1998, i.e. profit firms. Thus models 
(4b) and (5b) become: 
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MV]!"- fi.Ej, + P^NOBVj, + P.NARj, + P,,DL x NAR^, + p.^DP x NAR + s�,(4c) 
Rj, :Po+ PxEj, + p批” + P 摊 Rj, + P.lDL X NARjt + p,,DP x NARj, + s^, (5c) 
where DL equals 1 if the firm was an adopting firm with negative earnings. Otherwise 
DL equals 0. And DP equals 1 if the firm was an adopting firm with positive earnings. 
Otherwise DP equals 0. 
In the first research design, coefficients on book equity value, earnings and net AR 
may be different for adopting and non-adopting firms because of their different financial 
characteristics. 
In the second research design, the prediction is that Hypothesis 2 is supported. This 
suggests that investors distinguish between adopting firms and non-adopting firms and assign 
significantly different coefficients on NAR to them. Furthermore, they may disaggregate 
adopting firms into loss firms and profit firms. They may believe coefficients on NAR are 
significantly different within sub-samples of adopting firms. However, the relative magnitude 
of Pi/ p3 and Psa/ Psa ifisi / Psl and Psp/psp) can not be predicted here without preliminary 
information about firm condition of the two groups. 
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms are listed in Table 4. The deflator of all 
variables is total assets. Except for AR2, AR3, AR4 and MV，all the variables follow the 
normal distribution as required by the OLS assumptions. Thus square roots of ARl, AR2， 
AR3, AR4 and MV are used as mentioned in section 5.1. Particularly, though the skewness of 
the square root of ARl is much smaller than that of AR2, AR3 and AR4, in order to perform 
the F-test to compare the difference of coefficients on the aging component, the square root 
of ARl is used instead of ARl. 
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As a supplement，Figure 1 plots some scaled financial variables. The distributions of 
AR, square roots of AR2, AR3 and AR4 do not conform to the normal distribution. In fact, 
even after deflation, about 30% of the observations of AR, the square roots of AR2 and AR3, 
and 40% of the observations of the square root of AR4 tend towards their minimum values, 
leading to the high skewness to the right. As a result, the use of deflation and square roots 
become necessary in order to follow normal distribution. 
Table 5 presents comparisons of several financial ratios between adopting firms and 
non-adopting firms during the period of 1996-1998. I conduct both parametric and non-
parametric tests. Ratios in 1995 are excluded because they are at a too early stage to be 
compared. Panel A lists the ratio of AR allowance over AR, indicating that adopting firms 
made a significantly larger provision for bad debts than did non-adopting firms in 1998. 
Panels B, C and D record the ratio of different AR amounts over total assets, with AR under 1 
year old, 2 years old and 3 years old respectively. The statistics show that the average age of 
AR for adopting firms increases across the years while that for non-adopting firms remains 
the same. In 1998, the average age of AR for adopting firms is significantly longer than that 
for non-adopting firms, so the default risk for adopting firms is significantly higher than for 
non-adopting firms. Panels E and G present respectively the ratio of net income over total 
assets and the ratio of net income over book value of equity. The non-parametric test reveals 
that adopting firms earn significantly less profit than non-adopting firms for all 3 years. In 
1998, earnings of adopting firms drop considerably, with a negative mean E/TA. In Panel E, 
the ratio of book equity value excluding AR over total assets suggests that book equity value 
excluding AR represents a significantly smaller portion of total assets for adopting firms than 
for non-adopting firms from 1996 to 1998. This means that adopting firms own a 
significantly larger amount of AR than non-adopting firms. 
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The market to book ratio in Panel H indicates that non-adopting firms always have 
significantly higher market equity value over book equity value than adopting firms while the 
ratio for both of them decreases across time. Below-the-line-items in Panel I further reveals 
that adopting firms use below-the-line-items to reverse their 1998 earnings, since below-the-
line-items is negative in 1998 for adopting firms. Finally, Panel J records the market-adjusted 
rate of return. Ret of both adopting firms and non-adopting firms goes down across the years, 
but are significantly different between the two groups of firms in 1997 and 1998. Generally 
speaking, Table 5 indicates that adopting firms are in a weaker financial condition than non-
adopting firms. In order to further investigate the particular characteristics within the group of 
adopting firms, I divide them into loss firms and profit firms in Table 6. 
In Table 6，I first contrast the financial status of loss firms with that of profit firms. 
Nearly one-third of adopting firms are loss firms while the remainder are profit firms. Loss 
firms recorded a much larger provision for bad debts than profit firms in Panel A. Panels C, 
D and E indicate that the average AR age of loss firms is much longer than that of profit 
firms. Panels F and G reveal that loss firms recorded negative earnings for all 3 years, with 
the absolute value of net income being much higher than that of profit firms. This explains 
why the mean net income of adopting firms is negative even though loss firms constitute less 
than one-third of adopting firms in 1998. Panel H demonstrates that from 1996 to 1998, 
market equity value of loss firms increases while that of profit firms decreases, relative to 
book equity value. The result of Panel J is similar to that of Panel G. Loss firms even show 
positive returns in 1998. Panel I shows that loss firms always use below-the-line-items to 
enhance their earnings while profit firms use them to reduce their earnings. 
Moreover, I compare those financial ratios between loss firms / profit firms and non-
adopting firms. Mean NAR/TA for loss firms is higher than that of non-adopting firms in 
1996 and 1997 while mean NAR/TA for loss firms in 1998 is a little lower. In 1998，the gap 
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between the mean NAR/TA for non-adopting firms and loss firms (0.011) is much lower than 
the gap between the mean E/TA for non-adopting firms and loss firms (0.214). This means 
that even if non-adopting firms had reported as much provision for bad debt as loss firms, i.e. 
NAR/TA is the same for non-adopting firms as for loss firms, earnings of non-adopting firms 
would have been much higher than those of loss firms. Thus loss firms would have still 
earned the lowest net income even if they had not adopted the new accounting method. This 
finding is consistent with the "big-bath" phenomenon, i.e. with the smallest earnings, loss 
firms further reported a considerably larger amount of bad debt allowance in order to make 
the current year's earnings even lower and subsequent years' earnings even higher. However, 
M/B and Ret of loss firms in 1998 are higher than those in 1996 and 1997 and are near to 
those of non-adopting firms, implying that the stock market reacts positively to the "big-bath" 
phenomenon. 
As for the comparisons between profit firms and non-adopting firms, E/TA of profit 
firms is always lower than that of non-adopting firms and keeps a relatively stable level from 
1996 to 1998. Meanwhile, ROE and below-the-line-items of profit firms do not vary 
significantly. Moreover, in 1998, even though profit firms make a much higher provision for 
bad debt, net AR of profit firms has the same weight over total assets as for non-adopting 
firms, suggesting that profit firms own more outstanding AR than non-adopting firms. Thus 
profit firms may record a higher provision for bad debt to smooth their net income. 
Furthermore, investors always assign lower M/B and Ret to profit firms than to non-adopting 
firms. 
6.2 Empirical Results for AR and AR Aging Disclosure Information 
Table 7 reports regression results with AR and AR aging disclosure information. In 
1998, only empirical results of non-adopting firms are listed because adopting firms did not 
follow the fixed range of bad debt provision. Panel A is a benchmark to relate market equity 
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value only to earnings and book equity value. Coefficients (t-statistics) on E for the full 
sample and each year (1995，1996, 1997, 1998) are 3.03 (20.21)，2.34 (6.28), 4.55 (16.50), 
3.06 (12.41), and 1.98 (8.72), respectively. Coefficients on BV for the full sample and each 
year are 0.83 (15.21)，0.73 (7.01), 0.98 (9.84), 0.86 (8.93) and 0.80 (9.77)，always less than 
those on E. This result is consistent with the expected permanent nature of book equity value 
and the transitory nature of earnings. Adjusted R varies across the years, with the highest in 
1996. 
In panel B, book value of equity is separated into book value of equity other than AR 
and AR to examine whether AR is value-relevant to market value. Except in 1995, 
coefficients on AR are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
AR is incrementally informative to market value. Hence Hypothesis 1.1 is accepted. 
However, the F-test result that coefficients on OBV and AR are equal cannot be rejected. The 
multiples on OBV and AR are almost the same which denotes that AR holds the same 
information content in market equity value as do other components of BV. 
2 . 
In panel C, AR is partitioned into four aging components. However, adjusted R is not 
enhanced compared to panels A and B. Except in 1995, the coefficient on the square root of 
ARi is significant and positive at the 1% level for the full sample and for each year. This 
indicates that the stock market responds significantly to AR up to 1 year old. Except for 1996, 
coefficients on the square root of AR2, AR3 and AR4 are not different from zero. This is 
possible because AR more than 1 year old carries the risk of non-collection, indicating that 
this portion of AR cannot enhance the value of the firm in the market. As expected, except 
for 1996, the direction of coefficients on aging variables is that p^ ^ is much bigger than py^, 
py^  and y^ 34. This suggests that the older AR becomes, the less influence it has on market 
value. In particular, when AR is more than 1 year old, it begins to lose its explanatory power. 
In addition, the F-test supports Hypothesis 2 to show that investors assign significantly 
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different multiples to the aging variables for the full sample and the yearly sample in 1996 
and 1998. 
6.3 Empirical Results Concerning the Accounting Standard Change 
This section explores the impact of the 1998 accounting standard change on the value-
relevance of China's regulations on bad debt disclosure. Tables 8 and 9 present empirical 
results of sub-sample regressions and full sample regressions with dummy variables. 
Table 8 lists price model results. In Panel A of model 1，the coefficient on E of 
adopting firms is negative. This may be attributable to self-selection by the sub-sample, i.e. 
adopting firms tend to report lower earnings for the current year than do non-adopting firms. 
Meanwhile, for adopting firms, the coefficient on NAR is smaller than that on non-adopting 
firms, probably because of the high default risk on AR. The empirical results for non-
adopting firms in model 1 of panel A are similar to those in panel B of Table 6, which uses 
OBV and AR as independent variables. 
Panel B uses an indicator variable to separate adopting and non-adopting firms. 
Coefficients (t-statistic) on NAR and DAxNAR are 1.05 (6.70) and -0.86 (-3.55), 
respectively. The incrementally significant and negative coefficient on DAxNAR denotes a 
coefficient on NAR which is much smaller for adopting firms than for non-adopting firms. 
This means that adopting firms still have a lower quality of NAR than non-adopting firms 
even if they recorded much higher provision for bad debt. Moreover, the F-statistic (37.53, 
significant at the 1% level) accepts Hypothesis 3 to indicate that investors significantly 
separate adopting firms from non-adopting firms, i.e. they are aware of the issuance of the 
new accounting standard in 1998. 
Panel C further investigates the reason why the coefficient on DAxNAR is 
significantly negative, by using two indicator variables to represent loss firms and profit 
firms. The coefficient (t-statistics) on DLxNAR is 1.33 (2.90), significant at the 1% level. 
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This denotes that investors assign a significantly higher coefficient on net AR for loss firms 
than for non-adopting firms, probably because loss firms recorded such high provision for 
bad debt that investors believe that net AR of loss firms is close to the amount of AR that 
could be recovered. This means that net AR of loss firms is more credible. However, the 
coefficient (t-statistics) on DPxNAR is -1.53 (-5.76), also significant at the 1% level. This 
coefficient attributes to the lower multiple of NAR for adopting firms than non-adopting 
firms in model 1. It implies that investors may feel that profit firms still did not record the full 
amount of their bad debt expenses even if they adopted the new accounting method. Thus the 
NAR quality of profit firms is lower than that of non-adopting firms. Moreover, the F-
statistics (p-value) is 31.02 (0.00)，suggesting that investors further distinguish loss firms 
from profit firms. 
Table 9 reports the return model results. In Panel A, for both adopting firms and non-
adopting firms, the coefficient on E is negative, possibly because of the correlation with AE. 
For adopting firms, in model 1, the coefficient on NAR is not different from zero. The 
explanation is that the poorer quality of net AR for adopting firms may reduce the influence 
of net AR on the stock return. Otherwise, the coefficient on NAR for non-adopting firms 
indicates that the market return reacts significantly and positively to the net AR of non-
adopting firms. 
Again the dummy variables are applied in the models in Panel B. The results are 
consistent with those in Table 8. In model 1，I observe a significantly negative coefficient on 
DAxNAR. This demonstrates that investors assign a significantly smaller multiple to NAR 
for adopting firms than for non-adopting firms. The F-statistic shows that coefficients on 
NAR and on DAxNAR are significantly different from each other, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
In model 2，I find a positive coefficient on DLxNAR and a negative coefficient on DPxNAR. 
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The F-statistic is rejected to separate loss firms and profit firms within the sub-sample of 
adopting firms. 
6.5 Specification Check 
Alternative deflators are used to check the robustness of the regression results for the 
price model. The deflators are book value of equity and outstanding shares. First I put book 
equity value at the end of fiscal year t-1 as the deflator, which is recommended by Amir 
(1993, 1996). Then following Barth (1991), I scale all variables by outstanding shares at the 
end of April of fiscal year t. Since AR aging variables still show too large a skewness that 
cannot meet the OLS assumptions, I use the logarithm of AR aging components instead of the 
square root. This specification check yields similar findings to those reported in Table 8. 
Therefore, the sensitivity tests strengthened the above regression results. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper is the first to investigate the value-relevance of AR aging disclosure of A-
share listed firms to the market value of securities, along with the impact of the issuance of 
the ARSLC in January 1998, against the specific setting of the Chinese accounting system 
and the emerging capital market. There is no previous literature that directly addresses the 
information content of AR aging disclosure because the highly mature and informative 
accounting systems have already existed in developed countries. In this paper, major 
regressions are performed on the price model with a sample of 2,225 firm-years, during the 
period 1995-1998. Then dummy variables are utilized and the return model is included to 
examine the effects of the accounting standard change in 1998. 
My findings show that AR has an incremental information content in market value of 
equity in addition to that of net income and other components of book equity value. AR is 
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presented in the form of AR aging components to examine whether investors disaggregate 
AR into four aging variables. The F-test for equality of the aging component coefficients is 
rejected, indicating that investors implicitly assign significantly different multiples to each 
aging variable. The direction is that a coefficient on AR at a younger age is larger than that 
on AR at an older age. Specifically, the stock market significantly and positively reacts to AR 
up to 1 year old, while AR above 1 year old loses almost all its power to influence market 
value. 
An investigation of the new accounting standard concludes that investors are 
sophisticated enough to take into account the different accounting method concerning bad 
debt provision following the issuance of ARSLC. Hence they differentiate adopting firms 
from non-adopting firms and further distinguish loss firms (net income < 0) from profit firms 
(net income > 0) within the sub-sample of adopting firms. Statistical evidence shows that 
those firms who have more credit sales and larger amounts of outstanding AR are more likely 
to adopt the new accounting method. The motivation for loss firms to record a high provision 
for bad debt is to take a "big-bath". Meanwhile, profit firms seem to accept the new 
accounting method as a way to smooth their net income. Empirical results demonstrate that 
investors believe that loss firms record their full bad debt expenses as provision for bad debt 
while profit firms do not. Thus investors assign a higher coefficient to net AR for loss firms 
and a lower coefficient to net AR for profit firms, compared with the coefficient on net AR 
for non-adopting firms. Generally speaking，investors still consider the quality of net AR for 
adopting firms to be even worse than for non-adopting firms. 
To sum up，this study provides empirical evidence that information on AR aging 
disclosure is value-relevant and reliable to investors in China's A-share capital market and 
that the new accounting standard issued in January 1998 is effective to some degree by 
linking differences in the quality of adopting and non-adopting firms to their net AR. It 
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contributes to current studies on the capital market in China by first analyzing the information 
content of the financial disclosures of Chinese A-share firms. The practical implications are 
that policy makers should seek more faithful and detailed accounting rules to discourage the 
behavior of disclosing incomplete financial information. Meanwhile, investors need to pay 
attention to China's particular economic circumstances and regulatory climate in accounting 
in their quest to acquire unbiased information from relevant financial disclosures. 
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Appendix 1: 
Selected 1998 annual report of Shenzhen Zhonghao Co. Ltd (Company ID: 0015): 
• Main Accounting Data and Financial Ratio... 
1998 1997 1996 
Total assets 903,056,068.80 1,149,465,467.49 1,273,532,222.15 
Shareholders'equity 316,506,094.34 44,374,466.41 161,990,513.16 
• Disclosure of Financial Statements... 
2. Main Accounting Policies... 
(5) Bad Debt Estimation Method 
Our company adopts the Bad Debt Allowance Method to estimate bad debt,. The Age Analysis 
Method is used to extract provision for bad debt. Provision for bad debt is 0% for receivables with the 
age of less than 1 year, 20% for receivables with the age of from 1 year to 2 years, 50% for receivables 
with the age of from 2 years to 3 years, 100% for receivables with the age of more than 3 years... 
6. Accounts Receivable 
Age 1998.12.31 1997.12.3 1 
Less than 1 yr 11,076,100.14 7,576,236.96 
From 1 to 2 yr 2,299,508.11 2,539,571.70 
From 2 to 3 yr 1,908,438.22 1,088,658.43 
More than 3 yr 82,955,750.56 81,198,584. 72 
Total 98,239,797.03 92,403,051.81 
* No accounts receivable is from a stockholder who holds at least 5% of our company's stocks... 
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Table 1 
The Structure of Chinese Main Accounting Regulations for Listed Firms  
Regulator Main Regulations Applicable Enterprise 
Ministry of Accounting Regulations for Experimental 
Finance Experimental Shareholding Shareholding 
Corporations - Accounting Items and Corporations 
Accounting Statements (Jan. 1992) 
Accounting Standards for Business All enterprises 
Enterprises (Jul. 1993) 
Accounting Regulations for Shareholding Limited 
Shareholding Limited Corporations - corporations 
Accounting Items and Accounting 
Statements (Jan. 1998) 
China Securities Interim Regulation on Administering t h e P u b l i c listed companies 
Regulatory Issuance and Trading of Shares (April 
Committee 1993) 
Implementing Regulations on the Public listed companies 
Information Disclosures for Public 
Listed Companies (June 1993) 
Guidelines on the Information Public listed companies 
Disclosures for Public Listed 
Companies (No.l -No.7) (1994, 1997) 
Supplementary Notice on the Policy on Public listed companies 
Issuing New Shares (1994) 
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Table 2 
Sample Selection and Composition  
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure  
Number of Firm-year 
a. Sample Selection for Price Model 
Total firm-year covered by Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Data Base 
and annual reports published in newspapers, 1996-1998 3,783 
Less: 
Firm-years with missing allowance data in TEJ ( 364) 
Firm-years with missing income statement data in TEJ ( 952) 
Firm-years with missing balance sheet data in TEJ ( 1) 
Firm-years with missing AR and AR aging data in newspapers ( 232) 
Firm-years with missing equity price data in TEJ ( 9} 
Final Sample for Price Model 2,225 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Stock Exchange and Year  
" E ^ a n g e 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total — 
Shanghai ]M B ? 377 426 1；226 
Shenzhen 82 186 342 389 999 
Total ^ 719 ^ 2,225 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for AR Data under Four Age Periods for Full Sample and Each of 
the Sample Year 
Percentiles 
Mean Std. Dev. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
ARI:  
" T ^ 0：091 OMO 0 0027 M n 0 l 3 5 0.640 
1995 0.076 0.072 0 0.018 0.053 0.112 0.367 
1996 0.092 0.085 0 0.025 0.071 0.139 0.640 
1997 0.092 0.078 0 0.029 0.075 0.134 0.506 
199 8 0.095 0.080 0 0.030 0.076 0.139 0.476 
AR2:  
" T ^ 0016 0025 0 0002 0!W7 0.021 0.342 
1995 0.015 0.026 0 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.140 
1996 0.017 0.028 0 0.002 0.008 0.022 0.342 
1997 0.015 0.023 0 0.002 0.007 0.019 0.272 
199 8 0.017 0.025 0 0.002 0.008 0.024 0.306 
AR3:  
"Toffl OMS 0 aooo 0.008 0.155 
1995 0.007 0.015 0 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.127 
1996 0.007 0.012 0 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.087 
1997 0.006 0.012 0 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.155 
199 8 0.007 0.012 0 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.107 
AR4:  
Total 0 ^ 5 0 T 3 0 0 OOM 0005 0264" 
1995 0.004 0.013 0 0 0.000 0.002 0.170 
1996 0.005 0.012 0 0 0.001 0.004 0.167 
1997 0.006 0.012 0 0 0.001 0.006 0.098 
199 8 0.006 0.015 0 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.264 
All variables are in thousands ofRMB reported at the end of each year, scaled by total 
assets at the end of each year. Aging variables include ARI, AR2, AR3 and AR4: ARI 
represents AR within 1 year old; AR2 represents AR from 1 year to 2 years old; AR3 
represents AR from 2 years to 3 years old; AR4 represents AR more than 3 years old. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Financial Statement and Market Data, 1995-1998 
Percentile 
Skewness Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 
OBV -0.086 0.431 0.211 0.282 0.434 0.581 
NI -1.778 0.053 0.067 0.031 0.058 0.082 
AR 1.139 0.120 0.097 0.041 0.100 0.177 
ARl 1.340 0.091 0.080 0.027 0.072 0.135 
AR2 4.271 0.016 0.025 0.002 0.007 0.021 
AR3 4.052 0.007 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.008 
AR4 7.343 0.005 0.013 0 0.001 0.005 
MV 2.421 2.656 1.792 1.464 2.244 3.301 
Square root of 
ARl 0.135 0.270 0.135 0.164 0.268 0.367 
Square root of 
AR2 1.153 0.101 0.078 0.040 0.085 0.145 
Square root of 
AR3 1.393 0.060 0.057 0.015 0.047 0.088 
Square root of 
AR4 1.986 0.047 0.057 0.015 0.047 0.088 
Square root of 
MV 1.032 1.556 0.483 1.210 1.498 1.817 
All variables are deflated by total assets at the end of each year. OBV, NI, AR, ARl, 
AR2, AR3, AR4 and TA are reported at the end of each year. MV is reported at the 
beginning of May of each year. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Adopting Firms and Non-adopting Firms during 1996 - 1998 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for AAR/AR^ 
"Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 0.003 0.004 F = 0.688，ChiSQ 二 0.905 
~N^-adopting 382 0.005 0.003 
1997 Adopting 90 0.005 0.004 F = 0.008, ChiSQ = 2.159 
"N^-adopting 647 0.005 0.003 
1998 Adopting 106 0.124 0.053 F 二 350.114***, ChiSQ 二 202.63*** 
"ITon-adopting 713 0.005 0.004 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for ARR2/TA^  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 7l aj029 OMS F = 0.007, ChiSQ = 0.555 
Non-adopting 382 0.029 0.014 
1997 Adopting 90 0.034 0.020 F 二 3.476*, ChiSQ = 5.449** 
~Wn-adopting 647 0.026 0.015 “  
1998 Adopting 106 0.042 0.023 F-10.141***, ChiSQ - 5.089*** 
"l?^-adopting 713 0.029 0.015 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for ARR3/TA^  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 0.014 0.007 F = 0.859, ChiSQ = 2.484 
"Non-adopting 382 0.012 0.004 “ 
1997 Adopting 90 0.016 0.006 F = 3.635*, ChiSQ = 2.142 
Non-adopting 647 0.012 0.005 
1998 Adopting 106 0.025 0.009 F-27.318***, ChiSQ = 10.958*** 
Non-adopting 713 0.012 0.005 “ 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for AR4/TA^ 
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 OOO^ OOOl F 二 0.006, ChiSQ = 0.827 
N o n - a d o p t i n g O 0 5 0.001 
1997 Adopting 90 0007 OMl F = 1.308, ChiSQ = 1.817 
N o n - a d o p t i n g ^ 0.005 0.001 
1998 Adopting O T S 0： 0 0 4 F = 37.051***, ChiSQ = 14.393*** 
Non-adopt ing713 0.001 
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for E/TA® 
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 0.033 0.027 F = 9.653***, ChiSQ = 16.342*** 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 0 0 5 8 0.059 
1997 Adopting 90 0.033 0.038 F 二 11.703***, ChiSQ = 27.175*** 
Non-adopting 647 0.060 0.064 “ 
1998 Adopting 106 -0.009 0.023 F = 78.895***, ChiSQ - 50.156*** 
Non-adopting 713 0.056 0.060  
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Panel F: Descriptive statistics for OBV/TA^ 
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 0.375 0.354 F 二 2.789*, ChiSQ = 3.683* 
1 ^ - a d o p t i n g 382 0.419 0.429 
1997 Adopting 90 0.390 0.357 F = 5.137**，ChiSQ = 6.636** 
"Non-adopting 647 0.444 0.451 
1998 Adopting 106 0.370 0.356 F = 12.810***, ChiSQ = 11.127*** 
"N^-adopting 713 0.450 0.456 
Panel G: Descriptive statistics for ROE^  
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 0.059 0.071 F 二 0.975, ChiSQ = 11.279*** 
"1^-adopting 382 0.091 0.110 
1997 Adopting 90 0.047 0.088 F = 0.013, ChiSQ 二 22.478*** 
I to -adop t ing 647 0.055 0.109 
1998 Adopting 106 0.003 0.044 F = 0.526, ChiSQ = 4 5 . 1 6 1 * * * ^ 
Non-adopting 713 0.069 0.105 — 
Panel H: Descriptive statistics for M/B^  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 71 4.391 3.729 F 二 24.480***, ChiSQ = 43.708*** 
Non-adopting 382 6.328 5.644 
1997 Adopting 90 3.815 3.176 F = 16.863***, ChiSQ 二 48.192*** 
" T ^ a d o p t i n g 647 5.958 4.937 
1998 Adopting 106 3.306 2 . 5 W ~ F = 6.015**, ChiSQ = 31.950* 
l ^ a d o p t i n g 713 4.446 3.752 
Panel I: Descriptive statistics for Below-the-Line-Items' 
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 63 0.004 0.003 F = 0.287，ChiSQ = 0.140 
Non-adopting 276 0.007 0.003 “ 
1997 Adopting 75 0.007 0.002 F 二 1.910，ChiSQ = 1.894 
Non-adopting 469 0.002 -0.001 
1998 Adopting 83 -0.013 -0.007 F = 14.972***, ChiSQ = 10.925*** 
Non-adopting 554 0.002 -0.002 “ 
Panel J: Descriptive statistics for Ret* 
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Adopting 58 0.089 -0.064 F = 0.754，ChiSQ = 0.928 
Non-adopting 230 0.269 -0.017 “ 
1997 Adopting 80 -0.002 -0.080 F 二 6.696***，ChiSQ = 6.382* 
Non-adopting 495 0.153 0.023 
1998 Adopting 100 0.010 -0.091 F 二 4.335**，ChiSQ = 10.299*** 
Non-adopting 641 0.089 0.013— 
a. AAR/AR = provision for bad debt divided by AR at year end 
b. ARR2/TA = AR more than 1 year old at year end divided by total assets at year end 
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c. ARR3/TA = AR more than 2 years old at year end divided by total assets at year end 
d. AR4/TA = AR more than 3 years old at year end divided by total assets at year end 
e. E/TA = net income at year end divided by total assets at year end 
f. OBV/TA = book value other than AR at year end divided by total assets at year end 
g. ROE = return on equity, calculated as net income at year end divided by book 
value of equity at year end 
h. M/B 二 market to book ratio 
i. Below-the-Line-Items = net income minus operating income, divided by total assets at year end 
j. Ret = market adjusted rate of return, calculated as the difference of adjusted 




Descriptive Statistics for Loss Firms, Profit Firms and Non-adopting Firms  
during 1996 - 1998 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for NAR/TA^  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 0.138 0.147 F = 0.145，ChiSQ = 1.338 
Profit 64 0.117 0.097~~ 
" l ^ a d o p t i n g 382 0.120 0.094 
1997 Loss 11 0.160 0.124 F = 1.233, ChiSQ= 1.424 
Profit 79 0.108 0.102 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 6 4 7 0 T T 9 0.102 
1998 Loss 32 0.113 0.077 F = 0.165, ChiSQ 二 0.669 
Profit 74 0.123 0.112 
" T ^ a d o p t i n g 713 0.124 0.106 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for AAR/AR  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 0.003 0.003 F = 0.345, ChiSQ = 2.078 
Profit 64 0.003 0.004 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 0 0 0 5 0.003 
1997 Loss 11 0.004 0.005 F 二 0.004, ChiSQ 二 2.653 
Profit 79 0.005 Q.004~ 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 6 4 7 0 ： ^ 0.003 
1998 Loss 32 0.223 0.160 F - 262.129***, ChiSQ - 203.12*** 
Profit 74 0.087 0.033 
"N^n^adopting 713 0.005 0.004 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for ARR2/TA  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 0.055 0.069 F = 1.865, ChiSQ 二 8.090** 
Profit 64 0.026 0.016 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 0 . 0 2 9 0.014 
1997 Loss 11 0.077 0.059 F = 11.346***，ChiSQ = 11.716*** 
Profit 79 0.028 0.017 
"Non-adopting 647 0.026 0.015 
1998 Loss 32 0.075 0.048 F = 11.346***，ChiSQ 二 11.716*** 
Profit 74 0.030 0.016 
Non-adopting 713 0.029 0.015 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for ARR3/TA  
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics  
1996 Loss 7 0.024 0.028 F 二 1.499, ChiSQ = 5.326* 
Profit 64 0.013 0.006— 
Non-adopting 382 0.012 0.004 “ 
1997 Loss 11 0.044 0.020 F 二 13.836***, ChiSQ = 8.24** 
Profit 79 0.012 0.005 
"N^-adopting 647 0.012 0.005 
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1998 Loss 32 0.053 0.033 F 二 43.735***，ChiSQ 二 30.588*** 
Profit 74 0.014 0.006~~ 
Non-adopting 713 0.012 0.005 
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for AR4/TA  
Year Firm Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 0.008 0.002 F = 0.225, ChiSQ 二 0.922 
Profit 64 0.004 0.001 
" l ^ a d o p t i n g 382 0.005 0.001 
1997 Loss 11 0.018 0.011 F = 6.159***, ChiSQ 二 9.903*** 
Profit 79 0.005 0.001 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 6 4 7 O M S O M l ~ 
1998 Loss 32 0.032 0.014 F 二 49.059***，ChiSQ - 26.556*** 
Profit 74 0.008 0.002 
"N^adopt ing 713 0.005 0.001 
Panel F: Descriptive statistics for E/TA  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 -0.084 -0.087 F 二 20.348***, ChiSQ - 27.113*** 
Profit 64 0.046 0.038 
N o n - a d o p t i n g 0 . 0 5 8 0.059 
1997 Loss 11 -0.089 -0.096 F-25.568***, ChiSQ = 42.013*** 
Profit 79 0.050 0.047 
"Non-adopting 647 0.060 0.064 
1998 Loss 32 -0.158 -0.148 F - 160.081***, ChiSQ - 85.056*** 
Profit 74 0.047 0.039 
"T^-adopting 713 0.056 0.060 
Panel G: Descriptive statistics for ROE  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics ‘ 
1996 Loss 7 -0.253 -0.272 F = 6.542***, ChiSQ - 23.436*** 
Profit 64 0.093 0.098 
"N^-adopting 382 0.091 0.110 
1997 Loss 11 -0.281 -0.286 F 二 1.738, ChiSQ = 38.481*** 
Profit 79 0.093 0.100 
"Non-adopting 647 0.055 0.109 
1998 Loss 32 -0.202 -0.480 F 二 1.382，ChiSQ = 74.254*** 
Profit 74 0.081 0.083 
Non-adopting 713 0.069 0.105 
Panel H: Descriptive statistics for M/B  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics “ 
1996 Loss 7 3.400 3.899 F - 12.652***, ChiSQ = 44.846*** 
Profit 64 4.500 3.693— 
Non-adopting 382 6.328 5.644 
1997 Loss 11 3.545 3.699 F-8.442***, ChiSQ = 48.277*** 
Profit 79 3.853 3 .173~ 
Non-adopting 647 5.958 4.937 
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1998 Loss 32 4.306 4.554 F = 4.013**，ChiSQ = 5 4 . 6 7 4 * * * ^ 
Profit 74 2.927 
"N^adopt ing 713 4.446 3.752 
Panel I: Descriptive statistics for Below-the-Line-Items  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 6 -0.040 0.002 F 二 7.807***, ChiSQ = 1.688 
Profit 57 0.009 0.004~~ 
"N^adopt ing 276 0.007 0.003 
1997 Loss 9 -0.008 -0.002 F = 2.030, ChiSQ = 2.858 
Profit 66 0.009 0.002 
"N^adopt ing 469 0.002 -0.001 
1998 Loss 25 -0.048 -0.026 F - 32.755***, ChiSQ - 33.968*** 
Profit 58 0.003 -0.003 
"N^-adopting 554 0.002 -0.002 
Panel J: Descriptive statistics for Ret  
Y e a r F i r m Type N Mean Median Test statistics 
1996 Loss 7 -0.416 -0.521 F = 1.057, ChiSQ = 3.183 
Profit 51 0.158 -0.054 
N o n - a d o p t i n g ^ - 0 . 0 0 2 
1997 Loss 11 -0.071 -0.137 F = 3.469**, ChiSQ = 7.484** 
Profit 69 0.009 -0.067 
"T^adop t ing 495 0.153 0.021 
1998 Loss 29 0.031 -0.013 F = 2.243, ChiSQ = 11.635*** 
Profit 71 0.001 -0.095 
"Tto-adopting 641 0.056 0.060 
a. NAR/TA = Net AR divided by total assets at year end 
b. Loss firms = adopting firms reported negative earnings in 1998, i.e. net income < 0 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Plots of Selected Financial Statement Variables 
A: Variable = Book Equity Value Excluding AR, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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B: Variable = Net Income, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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C: Variable = AR, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
0 . 6 7 5 + * 1 * 
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D: Variable 二 Square Root of AR Within 1 Year Old, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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* may represent up to 7 counts 
E: Variable = Square Root of AR From 1 Year to 2 Years old, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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F: Variable = Square Root of AR From 2 Years to 3 Years Old, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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* may represent up to 14 counts 
G: Variable = Square Root of AR More Than 3 Years Old, Deflated by Total assets 
Histogram # Boxplot 
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* may represent up to 20 counts 
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